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RECENT DECISIONS
established in the Hoffman case, the district court determined that the witness
merely seized upon the privilege as a last ditch means to avoid answering questions
which would prove valuable to the special grand jury investigating the garment
district in New York.
It appears obvious that if the courts excuse witnesses from testifying where
their lawyers can unearth a possible stautory violation after refusal, then grand
jury investigations will be severely hindered. Contempt will not then turn on
whether in fact the witness believed he would be incriminated by his statements,
but rather whether a higher tribunal can supply the necessary statute which could
presumably be violated. No longer will the judge, faced with the witness, aware of
any facts revealed during the course of his questioning, be able to give full
weight to the entire surroundings in determining whether the witness in good
faith believes himself in danger of self-incrimination. Such a sweeping effect
reached through the approach of the majority in the instant case cannot lightly be
overlooked, and the privilege itself is open to a severe question whether, on close
inspection and study, it in truth serves the public interest.
Thomas T. Basil

In Rem; Tax Foreclosre-Notice
Property owner was known by the town officials to be an unprotected
incompetent. The town had fulfilled the requirements of section 165-b of the
New York Tax Law by posting, publishing and mailing notice of an action to
foreclose a tax lien on the incompetent's property. Since the taxpayer neither
answered within twenty days nor paid her back taxes within seven weeks, a
default judgment of foreclosure was entered and a deed was executed to the
town. Held (8-1): Such notice was not sufficient to satisfy the requirements of
due process. Covey v. Town of Sommers, 351 U. S. 141 (1956).
No person may be deprived of his property without due process of law,
U. S. CONST. amend. XIV; N. Y. CONST. art. 1, §6. One of the basic requirements
of this unrdefined concept is that notice, reasonably calculated to inform the party
of a pending action, must be given. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U. S. 457 (1940).
The notice which is required will vary with the circumstances and conditions
peculiar to the particular situation. Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 351 U. S. 200
(1956).
Although the Constitution does not specify any one particular method of
notice, that which is given must be calculated to be actual and effective. Milliken
v. Meyer, 311 U. S. 457 (1940). A state legislature may establish a method of
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notice but if it is in fact only a sham or gesture, it will not suffice. Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306 (1950). The constitutional
validity of any chosen method will depend on whether it was reasonably calculated
to inform the interested parties. Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U. S. 13 (1927).
In Nelson v. City of New York, 351 U. S. 930 (1956), the Court held that
notice by publication, posting and mailing, as required by the New York City
counterpart of the state statute involved in the instant case, was sufficient.
However, in a case decided on the same day, it was held that where the property
owner's name was known as a matter of record, a statute which only required
publication of a condemnation proceding against the property did not provide
for adequate notice. Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 351 U. S. 200 (1956). The
notice which was given in the instant case was therefore not sufficient; for as to a
known unprotected incompetent, it was not calculated to be either actual or
effective.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter expressed doubt, in a separate opinion, that the New
York Court of Appeals would sanction such an obvious and flagrant denial of
due process. A hypothesis which he posed in that opinion was confirmed as being
the true situation upon re-hearing before the Court of Appeals. Covey v. Town of
Sommers, 2 N. Y. 2d, 250, 159 N. Y. S. 2d 196 (1957).
The New York court did not hold that the notice provided for by the
statute satisfied the requirements of due process as to a known unprotected incompetent. It merely held that the incompetent's committee was proceeding in an
improper manner. Two years after the deed has been rcorded, a conclusive presumption exists that the action and the proceedings were in accordance with the
law and no action to set aside the deed may be commenced after the presumption
becomes conclusive. N. Y. TAX LAW §165 - h (7).
Since the appellants proceeded by means of a motion rather than by a
separate action, as is provided for in the statute, their motion was properly
denied. The appellants are now left without a remedy for when a statute operates
as a statute of limitation, a person may be barred from any action after a reasonable
time has lapsed. Saranac Land & Timber Co. v. Comptroller of New York, 177
U. S. 318 (1899). It was implied in the Court of Appeal's latest decision that
the appointment of the committee, while a sufficient time remained to commence
an action, cured any constitutional defect which might have existed.
*The fact that the Supreme Court seemingly decided the wrong issue in the
instant case does not deprive it of its noteworthy effect. It is now firmly established that notice served on a known unprotected incompetent in an in rem tax
foreclosure will not be sufficient to satisfy the requirements of due process. As a
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practical matter, the effects of this decision will be limited to areas with a small
population. The Court of Appeals readily accepted this proposition, but has left
the result in doubt if a committee, appointed after the presumption became
conclusive, attempted to bring an action to set aside the deed.
Robert J. Lane

Right of Licensed Practitionerto Enjoin Unlicensed
Practice in His Profession
In an action by licensed chiropractors to enjoin the defendants from practicing chiropractic without a license, held (5-2): the right to practice a profession
is a "valuable interest" and, since unlicensed practice infringes upon this interest,
equity may enjoin such practice despite the fact that it also constitutes a breach
of the criminal law. Burden v. Hoover, 9 II. 2d 114, 137 N. E. 2d 59 (1956).
It is well settled that equity has no jurisdiction where an adequate remedy
at law exists. Lewis v. City of Lockport, 276 N. Y. 336, 12 N. E. 431 (1938);
County of Cook v. Davis, 143 Ill. 151, 32 N. E. 176 (1892). However, the fact
that the acts of a defendant subject him to prosecution under the criminal law
does not of itself deny equitable jurisdiction. If there is an independent ground
for equitable relief, the criminality of the act is only a factor to be considered by
the courts in determining whether equitable intervention is necessary. People ex
rel. Bennett v. Laman, 277 N. Y. 368, 14 N. E. 2d 439 (1938); 4 POMEROY'S
EQuiTY JURISPRUDENCE §1347 (5th ed. 1941).
Also, it is generally accepted that a license to practice a profession is a
property right in the sense that state actions which affect it must satisfy due
process of law. People v. Love, 298 Ill. 304, 131 N. E. 809 (1921); Bender v.
Board of Regents of State of New York, 262 App. Div. 627, 30 N. Y. S. 2d 779
(3d Dep't 1941). However, whether this property interest is sufficient to enable
a licensed practitioner to enjoin an unlicensed individual from practice is a
question which finds the courts in conflict. Those which answer in the affirmative
point to the extensive training which is a prerequisite to obtaining a professional
license (as the court did in the instant case), Doworken v. Apartment House
Owners' Ass'n of Cleveland, 380 Ohio App. 265, 175 N. E. 577, (1931), or take
as granted that a sufficient property right exists. Ezell V. Ritholz, 188 S. C. 39,
198 S. E. 19 (1938); Siefert v. Buhl Optical Co., 276 Mich. 692, 268 N. W. 784
(1936). Where relief has been denied, the courts have generally based their
decisions either on the theory that the licensing statutes were enacted for the public
benefit and do not operate to give individual licensees any rights which equity will
protect, New Hampshire Board of Registration in Optometry v. Scott Jewelry Co.,

